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2"OTh',R J:O:'ARDY.
---- C ....
MTTcUCTICI".

I

That maxim of our law whch
put in

Jeopardy for the

ional force in
law of England.

81ne

-ays "No man shall twice be

offence" althot.h of constitut-

tho United States had its

origin in

the common

The earliest English authority for this

naxin, is Lord Coke.

In his Institutes. (3 Inst.11.0) we find

it laid down as follows *If any person be indicted of treason
or felony or Iareeny and ':cad not guilty and theruloln a
Jury, is

returned and sworn the verdict nu1st be heard and they

cannot be discharged neither can the jurors in those cases
give a p,
rivy verdict but ought to give their verdict openly
In

eo:rt.

There has boon rntch ariticism it on this proposit-

ion as we find it here laid down by Coke.

It has been crit-

icised that it is too broad in its terms, that it is a mere
diatim and is not sujyortod by any judicial decision made
previous to that time.

It 'as however been cited as an

authority in a long line of English oases in which the question ofS second p;rosecution was involved.

Lord Hale, an

anthority of the first eminence in 2 Pleas of the Crown 294,
makes the following rtatement.

"By the ancient law if the

Jnry sworn had been once :.PrticuLarly eheT?
ad it

was ocoionly held they

Tith

t give iw. their

the pirson-

:erdict and

they could not be discharged before verdict rar Civcnml.

But

said be "The contrary course her for a long tire obtained and
notiing is irore ordinary than after tho jury w.orn and charged
with ML

prson and the verdict given.t if it

appoars to the

court that some of the ovidene is kept back, or taken off or
that

there nay be a fuller discovery and tho offense notor-

ious as murder or burglary and that the evidence though not
saffielent to convict the prisoner yet giver the court a
great and strong suspiicon of his guilt the court may dincharge the 3ury of the prisoner and remit him to the jail for
further evidence; for otherwise many notorious murders or
bivrglaries may pass unpunished by the acquittal of a persn
probably guilty when the full evidence is not searched out or
given."

Hale after pointing out the ap;-;arent inaccuracy of

Coke's statement proceeds to show that the practice of discharging Juries in the discretion of the court was in his day
greatly narrowed down.

Thi

he attritutes

tempted by the Judges themselves

".en

tc a reform at-

the n.ractice caae to be

perverted from its original lprpose of securing a fair trial
to subserve the ends of prosecutors in jolitical trials.

The

judges without any decition 3r p-recodent,
sultation wiong themselves laiR,

he says upon con-

"orn the rule that the Jur=y

should not be discharged in criminal cases in

te discretion

of the 3udge.
tbe atuse of this privilege for

A case which illustrates
suoh political -rTposes

is

the lrial

of two Jemit iriests

who were charged with complicity in tie Po.ish plot reported
in 2 State Trials 710, 327.
Jesuit was Lut upon trial

In this case '1aitebeard, a

and after he was given over to the

j ry fudge Scroggs on hearing that eleven j3Urors favored his
acquittal and only one stood for his conviction,

i:i:ediately

and for no other reason discharged the jury and remamded the
prisoner to jail to Pwait

nother trial for his life; and he

was subsequently triedconvieted and ',ut to doath.
has been neverely criticised and the extrenci

This ease

to which the

Judge carried his 1rerogative har sought justification on the
ground that it
history.

tooh jlace at r turbiAlent jieriod in

This is

English

admissible to a l14;ited extent as the

Judge who sat at the trial is far froa being above reproach
bnt recent authorities sear to think it
spirit

of the ti-nes

'as

in

line rith

the

1 n. D. D.

En exear nation of tho origingir.

t
V

volution of this

maxim so far, leads us to buliove that it was at first a hard
and fast rule from rhich the courts were not rdlo..:o

to de-

part; that under no circimstances could a jury be discharged
and the defendent again brought to trial.

GoiCg then to the

other extreme a d allowing alrost absolute discretion to the
Judges,

it soon ripened into a license and abuse for which

the judges were compelled to find a remedy.

This brought

abcut a reform and again the r;xift ts asserted al1nost as
broadly as was originally laid down by Coke.
The next important decision is that of R v Gould, Mich.T.
4 Gee. III.

The defendant ras indicted fIor murder.

jury was sworn and

The

b
bT ;r
thb evidenbe'whs in when one of

the JITrors was taken ill and left court and presently died.
The Jury was discharged and the prisoner sent back to jail.
On a writ of habeas corpus brought to have the defendant released the court

with a full bench of judges decided that he

could be put en trial at the assize, or the Judge might have
ordered a new Jun7 sworn irzediately and could have proceeded
with the trial.

This holdig was distinctly enunciated and

followed in the case of Anna Salbert, 2 Ieaeh 320(1734)
5o.
3S51 we find

In 3lackstane's aoint.entaries (4 31.
the rule laid down in this modified laretage,

"

J~iries cannot

be dishared except in cases of evident neceossity before
they give a vediat.r
After the adotition of tho Tohlural Constitution and Congress had recommended several

nen.rents for the better pro-

teaticn of the rights of the T-eo1-le this fifth one which was
adopted read as follaws; "hNor thpl Pny pevsor be nubJect for
the samwe offense to be twice put in
Now whether thin provision

Jeopardy of lifo or limb*.

ara,iontonded3c

to be declaratory or

the common law merely so as to be litited in its application
ta a case where the defendant hae been prasecuted and acquitted or convicted by the verdict of a jury is a question on
which we will find a great conflict has ensued among the
conrts of this country.
Blackstone says the pleas of auterfois acquit or convict
is grounded on the universal maxim of the common law of England that na man is to be brought in jeopardy of his life
more than once for the same offense. B1. Comm.535.
dourts taking this vie

Many
I

and arguing that tnasrxch as all

cases af peril do not aIount to jeopardy in the sonso that
It can be pleaded a defense in the English law have construed
this provision to mean more than the plea of a former prosecutin did at the co=.on law.

It has too been uniformly

held tthat this

rovision ii

'z;

Ui:-tod

t

Constitution

of tc,, United Ctates and

is only a limitation on tie c
is not a restriction u!jon tl.... strt

zor'ts; and accordingly

the same restrtittloi is foizncd in t .

o ons-tituti-I

of nearly

every state.
Frou this wo :!rixt'proaeed to a discusrion of tne cases
which have adjtdicated the tLeanire of this jrovision in the
State and United States courtz.
MIITIAL EL M

TS OF JEOPAMUY.

A -ierson is in jeo-Irdy when he is put upon trial before
a court of competent -jurisdiction,npon indictment "or information which is sufficient in form and smfbstanco to sustain a
conviction, and a ury has been charged rith his deliverance.
17 Wendell 33G; Co=.

v Clark, C S. & R. (pa.) 1533; Co~iey

Cdnst. Lim. 399.
A court is of cozetent jurisdiiction Tihich has jurisdiction of the particular offense ,.hich oJ ffnse -ras comittod
within the territorial liaaits and is 3xercised '.it'in

its

terms as regulated by lar.
Where an act conztituto;

a cririq agai:stj tY-.o sovtjreigzi-

ities- an the State and United States Eovorrxnent-

there'may

be a concurrent right to proceed ag.ainzt the offender in Cthe

conris of the so:,rrta
two goverrm:-ents

juri'2iction

eo that 7.1hichever of the

cquires jiurisdiction of him shal

bo entitled

to proceed "'ad finon lit'is" rithcut interfoerccu from the

other. U.I. v 1arhhart, 22 red. 235.
ant soveroienitior c...... -..
sme offense imlens it

!,.,at co-irts of differ-

urr..

vo

is oni arising

ii
,

ind'ction of the
sne law, common to

then all as the law of nations. U.S. v Piratses, 5 Thoat. 197.

And a tril

in one of thevi for such F chrxure is

a bar therefore in another.

But a !ersoi,

conksidered as

zay cor.itt two

crimes by doing'or omitting one act against Itwo governments
or sovereigns which can bc;ed

upon in tro

ri-arate tri-

bunals and the trial in one is no bar to a prosecution in the
other.
is

This is

the case

fhon a person eo:Jitts a crime which

an infraction of the laws of t"qio Stata and also of the

United States.
.qTich offense was corix-tted within th
of its

jurisdiction- inar:zT.ch Fs

torritorial limits

the territorial

inits

of

the Jurisdiction of no-arly all the courts are sharply defined
there is

little

difficulty in dotern ining in cost oases

whether an a t fall

itin

interesting case an this. as

a certain, j11risdiction.
is U.

v 3cnhart, 22

But an
ed.28 .

Here a white man in a quarrel shot and killed an Indian on the

Vatilla

Reservation in

Oreon.

of the state a.d acquittod.
for the same offense in

he was trir'T in the courts

I.o

a& Agn brovi'ctt to trial

the Unitos 3tates District Court.

defendant pleadecd forvir joo._
yr.
that tho duty has rlevolvold upon tw

The

Itlio oout said that in
LAtional
oowrnunt to

swpervise and control the intereonr;3oi betwonia the Indians
and its,citizens

so that as far a

os:i'J

each may be pro-

tected from wrong and injury by the other it

could not be re-

strained-and limited by the fact that the Indians are within
the limits of the state and the Vlea of former Jeopardy was
held not well taken.
The prosecut ion rust be on an indictment or information
sufficient in form end z-Lfztance to sustain a conviction- if
the indictment It fould by an illogally Crganized grand jury
it

Is

held not suxffL-cient.
A conviction

hlheimer v State,

39 1 iss. 548.

on a defective indictmient is no bar unless

Judgment has been taken and an execution issued thereon.Earj
State, 26 S.W.714.

But it

eilears tit

Iartial

v

endurance of

punishment Infleicted on a defective indictnant will be no
bar if

the judgment is

Wharton Grim. 'r.
ment in

& P.

reversed on the defendant's own iaotion.
See. 457,507

Quitc a subtle argu-

favor of thie -lea of forner jeoparely is

nade sonetimes

if prosecnition is had on an insufficient indictment on the
groind that defendant

is

-LuAsbment

mxbj;cted to the sae

this doctrine does not prevail with the colrts.

eous acquittal of ti,

An erron-

defendant on a good indictment even

without the J-dr-,,iont of the coart th;reon is.a
second prosecution.

but

Whorton PI.

t- Pr. 43C

bar to

a

And where an in-

dictment has been dismissed for variance it was held there
was no jeopardy.

If

at any time before the final Judgment

the prosecuting officer discovers any defect in the indictment he mayenter

a nal.pros. and have the defendant indicted

anew. 13ish.

Law.

Crim.

1021.

Without examining any more authorities we feel safe in
saying that aLything that is vitally defective in the form or
substance of an indictment and which wou]4 not support a
judgment against the defendant can be taken advantage of at
al

time before final jud&-icnt and execution end cannot be

pleaded as a defense to a subsequentrial
And a Jury has bean charged with his deliverance- this
the last

requisite to a legal jeopardy.

so charged the defendant

is

"Men they have been

entitled to a verdict which will

forever be a bar to another irasecution.
This is

is

the important point in

CoOley Const..Lim.399

the I:rocoutciig to dutor-

mine; for until it has reao'hed this stage there is no claim
that there has ever been P jeopardy;*nd a trial without a
A Jury conristz of twelve LIeM

jury is a nullity.

mistake as to this niuor
People v Barker,
term Jluy that it

render a trial

.ill
277.

33 Y.

It

is

and any

null and vaid.

also implied in

the

shall be C body of -conpetent ten and if

after the jury are sworn, one of the
incompetent either because he is

iu

in is

found to be

prejudiced, biased

or Il-

legally chosen he may be discharged and a new Jury selected.
66 Mich. 277; 1C Nev.

110.

A Cury nay also be dischar&d

for cause at any time before the idiatment is read without
entitling defendant to discharge as having been once in aeopardy, though his pveinptory challenges have beer. oxhausted.
State v Nash,

i4 S.W. 007.

In State v Robinson, 43 La. 701,

defendant was indicted

for larceny and-a jury was ii.%ahelled and sworn.

At this

stage of the proceeding the district attorney requested tam'porary suspension of the trial to prepare an apilicatln for a
continuance inorder to enable him to prooure the testimony of
an absent witness.

The appclioation was granted and the jury

discharged defendant ras P"ferwards found guilty and ujon an
an ap~eal'the court citing State v Hash,

supra held that the

defendant had, once been in
It

is

j ooardy and was discharged.

ra-ortant to determine what qualifications are

necessary to constitute a reao'na6ly exceptional juror in a
criminal case.

In RBie v State, 7 Ind. 336, the court said,

'*1e must have honesty,

capiacity,

independence and freedom

from prejudice and fror. any opinion folUded upon the partiOular evidence produced in the oase.'"
In

Peopalev T3akcr, 60

.

277,

the court,

*A disqual-

ification does not arise because it will require some evidence
to remove iryrpessionh or opinions founded from rumors,

news-

paper statements or from whatever source theso inia ressios
may have been re~aeived."

The authorities which we have ex-

amined only a few of .ich

have been cited support the follow-

Ing proposition.
When the jury is

corpleted have boon duly enjanelled and

sworn and added to tho other branches of t'lo court the indictment read and all the proliminary steps taken the defendant
Is

in

jeopardy and the jnry are charred with his deliverance.
Our inquiry has been so far to determine what are the

requisite elements which

must arpj:jar in

the coitrse of, any,

prosecution to warrant us in saying definitely that the defendant has once been in

Jeopardy mnl

is

therefore froo from

further prosecution and to -,oint out if pos.-ible) some of the
cafst by which we are to *e cui Ic in coriAng to this Corclusion.
We mist rerelrber
if it be only for a

that when jeopardy has once attached
oa3:.ont,

it

i3 in 'i-e

eye of t?.e law just

as effective a defense and just as intrmoimtable a barrier
to a second prosecution as thouCgh it had continued through a
Ing and aggravating trial.

But although the law is thus

rigorous, in guarding the defendant frow a second jeolardy,
we will see that circumstances may arise subsequently which
will render this defense wholly ineffective an a plea in a
second prosecution.

COr next step therefore isto consider

rcizstances arising subsequent to the attachment of jeopardy by whlj

ola
± farmer Jeopardy

tte 1'pYlicatlon of ti e

is entirely abrogated and we rill

IE!
Right here it

CTUAi OR SIAL'

do this under the head of-

RIALS

will be proper to allude to a former refer-

ence we made to a distinction between the -lea of auterfois
acquit or convict, as they are uxderstood in the English law
and the plea of former Aeolrdy as it is construed by some of
our courts.

The courts soeeu to reason th.at inasmuch as there
to suTi~ort either of, t'ere

must tave been a verdict df the jury
A

Rt

he

la,

,o.:o-a

in

the United States Cornstitutior

c:-

rinch broader than the

aOainst a second

u

':. th:roforo

;eolardy is

cisAgCi.h do

ions on this point are r-ot precedonts which Ameri-an co-urts
are bound to follow.
found in

>ut a further divertance of oiinion is

the decisions of t;4

United States and State courts

and their construction of this provision.
Mr. Whorton in his Criminal Law Sac. 574 in considering
the latitude which covtrts have allowed in

the discharge of

juries during the progress of the trial 'places the cases into
two general classes.
First,-

Mere any separation of the jury except in

cases

of sceh violent necessity as may be considered the act of God
is

held a bar to all subsequent iroceedings.
Second,- Where it

is

is held that the discharge of a Jury

a ratter of sound discreticn for the court and that when

in the exercise of a soimd discretion it

talzes plaoe,

it

pre-

sents no iiapedlient to a second trial.
The first

view -e s been taken by the courts of Pa.,

Va.,

N,C.,Te)m.,, Ind., and Ala.
The second view r'as taken by the United States courts and
follued

M{iss.

by the coirts of Yew York,

Ill..,

iass.,

Ly.,

and

in

An early case decidothis point was that of U.S.

th, United States co1irts on

v Porez,

defendant had been put cn trial

9 Wheat.

lowing ntatement,

tory tn 1aus
Sde

J

Iere the

for a capital offense and the

Jury after deliber;ti.g for a tir-c Fr.'~d beir
were dischargo.

579.

o-i-Aic

u +,a cl

to agree

:a:aeos 'tL.o fol-

"Ife are of teo opinion taat the facts conThe prisoner has not

stitute no legal bar to a future trial.

been convicted or acquitted and u.y again bu put upon his defense.

771 thir: that in

all cases of this nature the law

has investedl courts of justice with

authority to'disoharge a

Jury from giving any verdict, whenever in their opinion taking
all

the circuoxU;-tances

into conxideration,

necessity for the act,

there is

a manifest

or the ends of public justice would

otherwise be defeated."
In

a later case in

again enunciated by the

the same court the sane dootrime was
zsare judge, and after an exhaustive

examination of the Enlish authorities,
Ing conclusion.

he draws the follow-

"T.huIs wo see that the tn.axir

ic

ent0edded in

the very elements of teo coui.on law; and has been uniformly
cyonstrued to Prevent an inlsrmourtable barrier to a second
prosecution, when there has been once a verdict of convication
or acquittal regularly had xpon a suffa.toient

indictment."

These are plainly

*

re Uroat -iion-er decisions on the

eonstitutional intor-,retation of this provis'ion and they not
only settle the law in the United Itates courts but exercise
a profound influence over the state coinrts in adolting the
It is !-lain that Judge Story

same construction as well.

regarded the provision in 5th Amendment of the Constitution
as an incorporation of the co

an law,riaxim and construed it

in the light of the interpretation it had received at common
law.
In t)e construction put upon this provision by tbei first
line of cases,

the courts have argued that twice laut in Jeop-

ardy and twice put upon trial convey to the mind several distinct meanings: that the Constitution forbids a second Jeopardywhich arises as soon as the !JUri
deliverance of the Irisoner.

ii 'charged with the

They consider Jeopardy in its

etymological sense as a bar, and deny any right to inquire
further except in

cases of the mast overruling necessity.

Corn v Clark, 6 S. & R. 577: Willims v Cam., 2 Grat. 5G8;
State v
(Tem.)

:1res,
hayes 241; State v Waterhouse, 8 Yerger
278: Ned v Steto,

7 Porter 188.

Whorton thinks these two conflicting opinions can be reoneiled If

It be conceded that the discretion which a oourt

nch as would

is

Termitted to exercise be a legal necoeitY

If

spread upon the record ana!io a court of record to say

that the discharge was correct.

-But of these two views the

one which gives to the court a wider discretion in discharging
the Jury is

the courts

support in

plainly and rightly gallng

of the United States.
In 7 Ala. 250

,where the court had dliscsed of its

iness and the Jury were still

bus-

deliberating on their verdict

In a criminal prosecution for a capital offense It was held,
that the court had authority to discharge the Jury after a
reasonable length.,of time.
In
In

1:orgex

v State,

13 Ind. 215,

the jury had been 1*pt

custody beyond tbe, regular term of comrt.

The verdict

was received and entered on Tuesday after the exviraticn of
the tem.

It

was held that this uTas an error and there was

a Ia'pse and the defendant was entitled to an aoquital.
It
to be in

has also been held where the defendant was required
court when the Jury retukrned with a verdict but

failed to be p;resent that the court could declato a mistrial
and the defe4dant again *'e -ut upon his defense,
The death of a judge or a juor

is

a uxiversal ground

for the discharge of the Jury. Wharton Crim. Law.

Sec. 598.

Inasmich as the cases which we have exnaiincd serve to
indicate the direction in which tbe& courts are travelling and

it

is

evident that they are tending towards granting greater

discretion to the courts,

it

will p,;rhap.s be pro,er to close

this part of our subject with a discussion of some recent
decisions which are in line with this tendency.
In State v Lee, 30 Atl.

I0,

this tendency was ably

pointed out by Judge Iennsy as follows,

"Judicious legis-

latian for securing a full, fair, legal trial of each crimInal cause is not in derogation but in protection of individueal rights

and is

in full accord

ith

the principle that no

man shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. Putting in jeopardy raeans a jeopardy which is

real and h~s con-

tinued through every stagq jqf qne -' osecUtion as fixed by
existing laws

relating to lrocedure.'1

In this case an ap-

peal was allowed by the state on the ground that the court
had refused to adfmit some expert evidence into the case which
went to prove a question which was raised as to whether or
not a certain wound was self inflicted.
In Stocks v State, 01 Ga.

831, it

was held ,roer

for

the court to inform a Juror of the death of his mother and
discharge the jury.

The caurt said, "That which unfits a

Juror for the performance of hiis duty oroates a legal necessity
and such unfitness mpy result from wental sufferinc no less
than from physical

e in.

As civilization and refinement

have progressed there has been a growing disposition on the
parts of courts to recognize the influence of the feelings
and emotions on the mind as producing this necessity.

In

Hawes v State, 0 Ala., the sicness of a juror's

wife shown by the testimony of the attending physician to be
such that her safely, comfort and life depended upon the
presence and attendance of her husband was held to be such a
necessity as would authorire the discharge of the jury.
State v Tatman, 59 Iowa 471 presents a case of legal
necessity where the judEe after all the evidence had been
taken, was inforined by telegrau of the illness of his wife,
and the jury was held to be lawfully discharged.
In State v Davis, 31 W. Va. 300 after the greater part
of the evidence had been taken information was iiwawrted to a
Juror of the death of his son, it was held that a necessity
for the discharge of the jury existed.
In Sin ans v U.S.,142 U.S. 148 an affidavit ws made by
the district attorney to the court stating that a juror on
trial had sworn falsely in denying that he had -ev

knuh

or had any dealing with the defendant and the jury on his reIn hiu- o-pinion Judge Gray says,

quest was discharged.

'It

needs no argum ent to provo that the judge tuion re.celving such
infor.iation,

was fully justifiel

in

collusion under the :feculiar
it

concluding that such a

%iroiu.tancesattending it

irtossiloe for tua- jury in

considering thc case,

made

to act

with the independence and freedom on the part of each juror
required to a fair

trial

of the issue betweon the parties.

There can be no condition of things in which the necessity
for the ateroise of this power is :ore mranifest, in order to
prevent the defeat of the ends of public justice, than when
it

is made to ap.ear to the court that either by reason of

facts existing when the jurors were sworn, but not then diselored or

:nowr, to the

brought to boar

o rt ,or by r a on of outside influence

on the jury ponding the trial,

the jurors or

any of then are subject to suo-h bias or prejedice as not to
stand Impartial between the government and the accused."

We think that any further examination of causos
fluous and unnecessary.
enumerate all

It

is

would indeed be impossible

superto

the circiz.-.tances which could arise in which

the court would be called up.on to exercise its

discretion in

discharging a jury in

In

the course of a trial.

conclusion

we

can lay down one proposition or rule which is

from all

the cases;

and that is,

deducible

the court 1.ay discharge a

jury whenever a noceeL:ity for so doing shall arise but the
various circastan-rs

.vvler which such a necessity exists is

not reducible to any rule.

An examination of the recent

decisions has shown however,

that the 1odern tendency is

to-

wards extending the rule that"no man shall be twice put in
JepPardytto mean the sound judicial discretion of the court,
in

determining in

the acurse of a trial

when an emergency a-

rises which will justify the dischar~e of the jury.

Inasmuch.as tie

%lea of former Jeopardy is

classed among

the favorable pleas and As wholly for the defendant's own
benefit and protection we will see that he may waive this
defense the same as he cold
passed for his benefit

the statute of li:mitationsj

or as an infant could waivexa statute'

on reaching maturity which nade his contract voidable at his
option.
The most usual case in which the defendant waives this
privilege is when he

takes an appeal from a judgment which

ha4 been p4nounced against 'iim.
a direct appeal to be heard in

This ..ay take the form of

an ai:ellate

court or a motion

for a new trial, or to arrest or set aside a verdict of the
Jury.

There the dofoncrant a:peals Jirou a judm:nt and pro-

Mcres a reversal ani a n
eversal in

trial

is

()r(erad
t

jidgent

and

such a case mumt be assuued to be set aside at

the instance of tho defendatt,

upon the theory that upon

prouring the reversal or affirmance of the Judgent he impliedly consents to all

the consequences legitimately follow-

tng sich reversal or affirmanoe.
Ene.

& Aza.

Encye.

of Law,

Vol.

Dishop's Crim. Law,
11.

1004,1016

130.

Defendant may also by consenting to the discarge of the
Jury waive his defense.
or implied.

If

This consent may be either express

during the trial the jury is discharged with

defendant's concurrence,
and he may again be

this i:plies

ut iron trial,

a waiver of his right
v Stato,1 Hump.

102;

2 Grat. 507.
The defendaxt also can V'y his conduct raive his defense
as where he absents hi. .-elf from court, when the verdict is
rendered when he is
Battle, 7 Ala.
We Das

required by la

to be present.

State v
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now to consider the last head into which our

subject is dividd.

W6 MN TN1' DEII
AML

Ojr Pogigm~ JEp-

AN BE SUCCEASS~FULLY FLADZ

.

17e me t state at the outset that this Tilea is only available when the erime oharg~od is precisely ard identically the
same one for which teo r7ofndmat .-as caiargod in t-,e first.
We nust however observe an essential difference between
a second prosecution for te sane offenseand a second and
separate prosecution for different offenses coixtted 1?y the
same act.
to

To illtstrate; the dual relation of the citizen

the United States and State governments implies an obed-

ience to the laws of each.

'low we can easily understand

that an act might bo an infraction of a state 9oiand of a
United States statute as well- and it would be plainly destruotIve of both if

one could inflict a punisbxert for its

commiss-

ion which would be an in-zxnity from any prosecution by the
other.

It

would be a ruinous inovation by one government

on the legislative and judicial functions of the other.
an analogy of reasoni: i

By

this same doctrine aDilies to the

relation subsisting betwon

mmieipal and state governments.

In Ex Farte hong Shan, 013 Cal. 31, an ordinance of the
city regulated the sale of opiim,

and provided for a punish-

ment for a violation of the smne which was not inconsistent

with the Eeneral 1a':)

f

th. state.

DeftP,,a,'.t

ras

rosOcuted

=nder the city ord1::anc a-id on :rosecuition by the state subsequently for the same act the court held that it
constitute a violaticn of tho constitutional
putting one in
In

did not

inhibition against

jeo-pardy twrioe for the same offense.

Theisen v l.c David,

IG Z.F" (Fia.)

3!, a statute which

prohibited the sale of certain articles on Sundayj except in
case of necessity~and ,,uade the same punishable as a misdemeanor was held to be no constitutional bar to another prosecution by the state for the same act and punishable with
the same penalty.
Also in State v Reid, 20 S.E. 4CS, a prosecution by the
city for selling liquor las held no bar to a subsequent prosecut ion under the state law for the same offense.
These few cases are sufficient to illustrate the well
settled rule that an act or om!ririon which irnfracts two or
more statutes at the sae time may bo visited by successive
punishments by tne courts .- iwich have jurisdiction of each
without raisi.g

ar...y cc,,_tbtionalobjecticn.

Another case in which the question whether a man has
been once in

jeo:.ardy arises is

convicting him of so,.e other orie

where a j'idgment has been had

than that which was named

in

the indictror.t.

it

is

quito

erll sottied that a Jury

triic

tlian is

charged

cannot convict a

fsonera hiegi(
for

In

can convict him of a:Iy lower crime

the indict,-r.t; b'tt it

which is
If

inclued r ithin the tertis of the indictnlent.

the defendant is

necessarily included in

is

slaugter
In

charged with mixrder the crie

People v L'c Gowan,

17 Wend.

the charge.
366,

Thus,

of man4 St.Rep.117.

the defendant had

been tried and acquaitted of robberyj and again he was indicted
on substantially the sane charges for larceny.

The court

held that the indictment for robbery involved the question of
simple larceny, of which the prisoner Wrder the indictment
might have been convicted; and therefore the plea of former
jeopardy was valid.

The test niade by the court was in these

words, *To entitle the defendant to a verdict it m s necessary
that the evidence to su!xjort the last indictent would have
been sufficient to support the first indictment.
But it

will be necessary to bear in mind that there is

a

difference between a conviction of an offense of a lower
grade than that named in the indictment, ard a conviction of
the smae crime in alowor degree than the indictment charges.
An illustration of this principle is the People v Keffer,
65 Cal. 232.

The defendant

Tas charged in

the indictment

for rr!lmder, and ras found guilty of Ttrn1,'r in tle second
degree.

The court held that he could again be put on

for murder in the first degroe.
two cases seems to be that in

trial

The distinction rade in the

the fornier the defendant is

pI.,-dly acquitted 3f all higher offenses charged in

IM-

the in-

dictment by his conviction for the lower;and when the defendant
moves for a new trial he Povos only for a new trial of the
issue which has be.,n found against him.

In

the latter case)

the distinction made between different degrees of the same
crime is looked upon :Orely as a legislative classification
by which the jury

are to deterine the character of the crime)

and as a guide by which they may approximate t1e 1eqiuisit6
penalty.

In conclvding this discussion it is enough to say that
the doctrine of our law so finrrly ostablishel. 1or that "no
man shall be twice jut in jeop'ardy for the smame offense" is
fundamental as a principle of.justioe and to the finality of
Irgislation.

It had its origin in the early co-on law, and

was first enunciat#ed by T-rd lo:o, one of England's greatest
Judges.

It was a non-judiclal expression of Mhat he thought

to be a civil right, and although it has been criticised as

harsh and inflexible it has been a bafrier to a second -prostae offense at every stage of the English

secution for te
low,

and is

nLol rcognize1d in

in the civiliredo
stitution

overy systm2 ff JurisPrudense

It ras incororatod into the Con-

wor!,.

of the U'nibed states anrd it

has foumd its

wal

in

substantial terms into the constitution of nearly every state
in

the Union.

adnnistered was suitable to the, ago in which It
but in riodern tins

was adopted;

relaxed to meet the more

has bouv

it

was first

rigor with which It

The -L"yLeldingt

tolerable and hmaane conitions of civilization and whether a
man can or cannot now be tried thLe second time for the same
offense, will be answored by detertf.ning whether or not lt
would result in the miscarriage of justice, without reference
procedure.

to the technicalities of j;dicial

C"AI-

-- 7,I'l'.[.)-
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